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TAKING LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY: A
RETURN TO DEONTOLOGY
Eric Heinze*
Democracy is the ongoing product of public discussion.1 With
what legitimacy, then, can a democracy limit its citizens’
participation in that discussion? The question has crystallised in
recent years around problems of “extreme” expression,2 with a
particular focus on so-called “hate speech.”3
Extreme expression plays a paradoxical role in a democracy.
On the one hand, it involves a small fraction of all messages. Even
democracies passionately combatting it tend to bring few
prosecutions and to impose mild penalties. Stronger crackdowns
generally target high-profile provocateurs like Jean-Marie

* Queen Mary, University of London (e.heinze@qmul.ac.uk). I would like to thank
Antoon de Baets, Jill Hasday, Jim Weinstein, and Andreas Marcou for helpful comments
provided on this essay, and Tom Boyle for his editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY
v–ix (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter EXTREME SPEECH]; JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, MORALBEWUßTSEIN UND KOMMUNIKATVES HANDELN [MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION] (1983) (Ger.); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS [THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION]
(1981) (Ger.); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995) [hereinafter
POST (1995)]; Robert C. Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AMERICAN
ACADEMY POL. & LEGAL THEORY 24 (2006) [hereinafter Post (2006)]; Robert C. Post,
Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997)
[hereinafter Post (1997)]; Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97
VA. L. REV. 477 (2011) [hereinafter Post (2011a)]; Robert C. Post, Partipatory Democracy
as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617 (2011) [hereinafter Post (2011b)].
2. See Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, General Introduction, in EXTREME SPEECH 4
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009); cf. ERIC HEINZE, HATE SPEECH AND
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 18–26 (2016) (examining legal concepts of extreme “speech”
and “expression”) [hereinafter HEINZE (2016)].
3. See infra notes 12, 16 and 38.
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LePen,4 Geert Wilders,5 or Dieudonné M’bala M’bala.6 The
prosecuting states aim more for symbolic condemnation7 than for
comprehensive enforcement, which tops few democracies’ lists of
priorities. On the other hand, for many writers, including Jeremy
Waldron, extreme expression exemplifies a type of
communication that can legitimately be excluded from public
discourse, irrespective of its ranking within any broader scheme
of human problems. Under well-drafted bans, Waldron maintains,
speakers enjoy full freedom to state the substance of their views,
but can rightly be asked to exercise care in the form of words they
choose.8
As I shall argue in this article, that form-substance distinction
is what derails Waldron’s approach. Defenders of speech bans
cannot coherently divide acts of human expression into two
parts—on the one hand, the substance of a message, conveying its
viewpoint, and, on the other hand, that message’s particular form
of words, which might somehow be regulated without affecting
the viewpoint. Like other defenders of bans, Waldron fails to
establish his essential thesis, namely, that bans on extreme
expression can be reconciled with democratic legitimacy. In his
present debate with James Weinstein, it is Weinstein who—
although I do note one caveat to Weinstein’s view, for which I
shall propose an amendment—fundamentally succeeds in
depicting speech bans as democratically illegitimate. Fullyfledged democracies may take a host of measures to eliminate
discrimination, but cannot legitimately penalise citizens who enter

4. See, e.g., Rachel Roberts, Jean-Marie Le Pen Charged over Alleged Antisemitic
Remarks, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/jeanmarie-le-pen-charged-antisemitic-remarks-marine-le-pen-front-national-frenchpresidential-a7576151.html.
5. See, e.g., Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders Guilty of Incitement, BBC (Dec. 9
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38260377.
6. See, e.g., French Comedian Dieudonné Given Prison Sentence for Hate Speech,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/25/frenchcomedian-dieudonne-prison-sentence-hate-speech.
7. See, e.g., Christoph Seils, Selbstläufer symbolischer Politik: Wie ein Verbot der
NPD auf die politische Agenda kam. in VERBOT DER NPD ODER MIT RECHTSRADIKALEN
LEBEN? 44–50 (Claus Leggewie & Horst Meier eds., 2002) (Ger.); Julie C. Suk, Denying
Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of State, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 144–63 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012). But see
HEINZE, supra note 2, at 162–65.
8. See Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James
Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 700–01, 713–14 (2017).
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the public sphere to oppose pluralist
provocatively or crudely they may do so.

values,

633
however

1. THE DEMOCRATIC HURDLE
Various elements can render speech “extreme.” The blandest
idea—a nursery rhyme or a toothpaste advertisement—can be
broadcast at “extremely” high volume. Conversely, one can
communicate “extremely” dangerous information in a whisper.
From the outset, we must apply an age-old distinction in free
speech jurisprudence between the extremity of a message and
extremity in the manner of its expression. Today’s fiercest debates
about free speech emphasize the message. They focus not on
extremities of “time, manner, or place,” such as loud volumes late
at night in residential areas. Jurists and scholars widely agree with
at least minimal regulations for those elements.9
Nor do current controversies focus on objectionable content
per se. Experts readily agree that content such as commercial
fraud or courtroom perjury can be subjected to legitimate
regulation. Rather, our intractable disputes concern the
regulation of extreme messages on grounds of their viewpoint.10
In this article I shall use the phrase “bans on extreme expression
per se” to denote laws imposing penalties on expression because of
the viewpoint of the message, that is, because of its philosophy or
worldview, and not because of excesses in the time, manner, or
place of its communication.
Controversies about extreme expression have raged because
they raise questions about how various principles ought to govern
individual liberty. One, for example, is a consequentialist
principle. History reveals atrocious political consequences fuelled
by extreme speech acts.11 States, in the view of some observers,
9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION 38–48 (2015); JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1447–74 (8th ed., 2009); EDWIN C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 125–37, 162–63, 173–74 (1989).
10. Cf. HEINZE, supra note 2, at 19–22 (distinguishing between the concepts of
“content” and “viewpoint”); James Weinstein, An Overview of American Free Speech
Doctrine and Its Application in Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH, supra note 1, at 82–83,
86–87.
11. See, e.g., JOSEPH BEMBA, JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE ET LIBERTÉ
D’EXPRESSION: LES MÉDIAS FACE AUX CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX (2008) (Fr.); MARTIN
IMBLEAU, LA NÉGATION DU GÉNOCIDE NAZI, LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION OU CRIME
RACISTE?: LE NÉGATIONNISME DE LA SHOAH EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARÉ
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must regulate such acts in order to safeguard not only vulnerable
citizens,12 but the very survival of their democracies.13 The
problem with consequentialist arguments is that causal links from
extreme expression to mass atrocities have been established only
in societies that are either undemocratic or very weakly
democratic. Throughout decades of publications, any statistically
demonstrable pattern of such causal links within fully-fledged
democracies,14 despite such expression being constantly present,
have repeatedly been asserted yet have in no empirically reliable
way been documented.15
Another principle is dignitarian: in the interest of ensuring
basic civic equality for all citizens, government may legitimately
penalise heinous expression found to be targeting the human
dignity of others, particularly of members of socially vulnerable
groups. On that view, tracing material causation from hateful
expression to empirically demonstrable harms altogether
misconstrues the types of harms such expression causes: the
hateful expression is itself the harm.16
There are other such principles, reflecting liberal, republican,
critical, and radical approaches.17 One in particular becomes
decisive in the present debate between Weinstein and Waldron,
namely, a democratic one.18 For Weinstein, along with writers like
Ronald Dworkin and Robert Post, free speech ensures such an
exceptionally high political value that even extreme expression

(2003) (Fr.); ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES
THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002).
12. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?
(1999); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT
WOUND (2004); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
13. See, e.g., WEHRHAFTE DEMOKRATIE: BEITRÄGE ÜBER DIE REGELUNGEN ZUM
SCHUTZE DER FREIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN GRUNDORDNUNG (Markus Thiel
ed., 2003) (Ger.).
14. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 69–78 (examining conditions under which
democracies can be fully held to their legitimating criteria).
15. See id. at 125–29.
16. See, e.g., STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 164–83
(2008); Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in
EXTREME SPEECH, supra note 2, at 158–81; JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE
SPEECH (2012); Cf. infra note 38.
17. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 11–15.
18. See id. at 55–56, 88–94 (distinguishing between liberal and democratic theories).

5 - HEINZE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

TAKING LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY

10/1/17 9:55 AM

635

must be admitted19 into public discourse.20 Waldron agrees that
democratic legislation, administration, and adjudication draw
their legitimacy from the assumption of an open, public sphere in
which all viewpoints may be aired. They disagree, however, about
whether bans on extreme expression exclude speakers from that
sphere in any way that diminishes a state’s claim to democratic
legitimacy.
Suppose certain citizens are to be excluded from public
discourse pro tanto—that is, to the extent of their proscribed
expression. The question for Weinstein and Waldron becomes:
can the legal system legitimately be enforced against those
citizens, insofar as they end up excluded from democratically
essential processes of opinion formation? That question is crucial
for all writers who defend bans on extreme expression per se on
dignitarian grounds. Few of us, after all, can have any objection to
the state using democratic processes to promote the basic value of
human dignity through, for example, prohibitions on extrajudicial
killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, rigged trials, or forms of
racial or other discrimination. The problem arises when that value
is deployed in apparent conflict with certain necessary
foundations of a democracy. Dignitarians cannot legitimately
proceed to speech bans except via democracy, whose demands of
admitting all viewpoints must first be answered. Waldron’s
answer is that such bans need not exclude anyone from full
democratic participation21: “it is misleading to say that hate
speech restrictions prohibit the expression of certain views per
se.”22 In the remainder of the present essay I shall examine why
that view fails.

19. Dworkin, supra note 1; Ronald Dworkin, Reply to Jeremy Waldron, in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES
341–44 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012); POST (1995), supra note 1; Post (1997),
supra note 1; Post (2006), supra note 1; Post (2011a), supra note 1; Post (2011b), supra note
1; James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on Free Speech
Doctrine (1999); James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American
Concept of Democracy, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 146, 161-66 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001); James Weinstein,
Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA.
L. REV. 491 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American
Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633 (2011).
20. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 26–30 (distinguishing public discourse from other
spheres of expression).
21. See Waldron, supra note 8, at 703–04, 713–14.
22. Id. at 702.
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2. JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY
For Waldron, “the problem of legitimacy is to find a basis on
which a law may permissibly be enforced even against people who
disagree with its content.”23 He refers to that problem as “a
function of its neglect in political theory.”24 Such a claim is
puzzling, given that the pioneers of modern political theory seem
concerned with little else.
Whilst deriving from legitimatus, meaning “to make lawful,”
it comes into usage only around the late 16th century. Writing in
a precariously divided Europe, the aim of theorists like Hobbes,
Montesquieu, or Rousseau is to develop legal frameworks that
command obedience to substantive norms, notwithstanding
disputes about those norms’ substantive justice. To be sure, we
often use the term “legitimacy” in looser, colloquial senses, to
mean “rightness,” “reasonableness,” “fairness,” or indeed
“justice.” Weinstein and Waldron, however, use it to denote some
ethical reason for citizens to submit to a democratic legal system (“I
obey as a matter of principle, because obeying the law of my
democracy is the right thing to do”)—that is, some reason to obey
law beyond its sheer coercive power (“I obey solely as a matter of
self-interest, to avoid fines, arrests, prison sentences, or a bad
reputation”).
Early modern theory is dominated by the contractarian
model, a consensualist approach which revives in the 20th century
under the liberal-democratic schema of John Rawls. A legal
system, on the contractarian view, commands legitimacy when
plausible grounds can be adduced to suggest that we implicitly
consent in practice, or that we would explicitly consent in
principle, to submit to that system. For example, we rarely give
express consent to laws punishing homicides or larcenies;
however, on a contractarian theory, our consent can reasonably
be inferred inasmuch as (a) we ourselves desire those laws’
protection; and (b) even if we do not desire such protection, or do
not desire it in the particular form it takes within our legal system,
democracy presupposes our freedom to voice any dissent from the
prevailing law or to propose alternatives.
Plato had long ago penned the classic exposition of “speak or
obey”—we are bound to obey law insofar as we had an
23.
24.

Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
Id. at 698.
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opportunity to speak out in order to change it—in his dialogue
Crito. Yet that dialogue is, in two senses, an oddity. First, in
ancient Greek thought, Crito is an uncharacteristic example of
legitimacy distinguished from substantive justice, a step that
neither Plato nor Aristotle otherwise take in their political
writings. Second, contrary to common readings of the dialogue
enjoining absolute obedience to law, Crito by no means claims
universality across all political systems. Its “speak or obey”
mantra25 makes sense only for a regime, like that of ancient
Athens, in which a prerogative of parrhēsia, of frank, unhindered,
even dissident speech, enjoys quasi-absolute legal protection (at
least for all fully-fledged male citizens), indeed as constitutive of
the legal order.26
Plato’s other major political writings, such as the Republic,
Statesman, and Laws, remove that high status of free speech.
Adopting a model polis geographically and demographically
smaller and more homogeneous than the modern state, those
other dialogues envisage a more strongly shared recognition of
substantive justice among the citizens,27 thereby superseding any
distinct question as to the legitimacy of procedures irrespective of
substantive results. Aristotle, too, envisages a sufficient consensus
on substantive justice to be in principle achievable,28 a consensus
he deems adaptable to changing material or social
circumstances.29 By contrast, with the rise of the early nationstate, spanning far larger and more diverse populations and land
masses, the shift in focus from substantive justice to procedural
legitimacy becomes decisive, starting in particular with Hobbes.
Hegel launches over a century of theorists rejecting
contractarianism, from Marx to Heidegger, and others of all and
sundry outlooks, all stridently rejecting the contractualist
assumption of divorcing legal legitimacy from substantive

25. Crito 50a-e, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 37, 44-45 (John M. Cooper ed.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1997) [hereinafter PLATO].
26. Cf. Eric Heinze, The Constitution of the Constitution: Democratic Legitimacy and
Public Discourse, in RANCIÈRE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LAW (Julen Extabe & Mónica
López Lerma eds., forthcoming 2017).
27. See, e.g., Republic 5.462a, in PLATO, supra note 25, at 971, 1089; Laws 1.628a, in
PLATO, supra note 25, at 1318, 1322.
28. Aristotle, Politics 3.11.1281a42-81b6, 82a16-18, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1986, 2033 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (4th century B.C.E.) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE].
29. 2.8.1268b33-69a13, in 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 28, at 1986, 2013–14.
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justice—thereby, in an important sense, returning to the postures
of Plato and Aristotle.30 But we can leave those objections aside.
Despite their disagreement, Waldron and Weinstein tacitly agree
on a contractualist principle of legitimacy, disagreeing solely on
the question of where that principle “leads.”31 For Weinstein—
although this is not exactly his phrasing—a democracy that
excludes citizens from democratic opinion formation pro tanto
dissolves its social contract with them, relieving them of their duty
to obey law. For Waldron, no such breach occurs: insofar as
citizens remain free to express any viewpoint in substance, they
remain fully subject law; in that respect, any such social contract
remains in force.
Waldron’s suggestion of neglect of the problem of legitimacy
clearly does not apply, then, to Western political theory, which has
long placed legitimacy—the principle of law “enforced even
against people who disagree with its content”—at centre stage.
Such theoretical neglect does, by contrast, characterize certain
types of legal theory, notably of the old “how should judges decide
cases” variety. We can certainly identify familiar strands of
jurisprudence undertaken both by judges and by scholars “writing
as” judges, who aim to interpret norms that they identify as
already-established in law. That task of expounding the law’s
already-adopted norms either (a) assumes those norms’
legitimacy within the legal system by definition, or (b) assumes
legitimacy to be a false or irrelevant question. Both (a) and (b)
are indeed attitudes that “neglect” questions of legal legitimacy.
Genuine questions of legitimacy arise only when the rightness of
already-admitted
norms,
or
of
otherwise
prevailing
interpretations of them, comes into question.
What, then, is legitimacy? Waldron’s reference to law
permissibly enforced against people who disagree with its content
is adequate enough, subject to two reservations. First, I shall
substitute his adverb “permissibly” with “rightly.” After all, a
magistrate could issue a warrant for a police squad to arrest a
given citizen, knowing full well that the citizen has done nothing
unlawful. When the police make the arrest, they do it
“permissibly,” because a warrant is by definition a permission.
They do not, however, make the arrest rightly, even if
30.
31.

See, e.g., ERIC HEINZE, THE CONCEPT OF INJUSTICE 42-49 (2013).
Waldron, supra note 8, at 700.
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responsibility for the wrongful arrest lies entirely with the
magistrate. Second, I shall substitute Waldron’s noun “content”
with the word “justice.” After all, a dispute about a law’s
“content” can be entirely semantic. Individuals may agree on a
law’s aim, disputing only whether the “content” of a draft text, in
the sense of its wording, is most conducive to achieving that aim
as matter of sheer clarity, efficiency, strategy, or logistics. Those
technical disputes are irrelevant to the problem of legitimacy. I
shall postulate, then, that to be legitimate, a law must be rightly
enforceable even against citizens who dispute its justice.
Two central questions of legitimacy arise in the present
debate. The first is the question about the legitimacy of speech
bans as such: can a democracy legitimately exclude extreme
expression per se from public discourse? The second is the
question about whether a democracy can rightly enforce other
laws against persons who have been pro tanto excluded from
democratic public discourse. The importance of the debate
between Weinstein and Waldron is that it illustrates how that
second question becomes decisive for resolving the first: if a
democracy may not rightly enforce other laws against citizens
excluded pro tanto from public discourse, then bans on extreme
expression perforce become illegitimate. That is the question to
which we now turn in Section 3, as it will depend on whether bans
on extreme expression per se end up necessarily excluding
viewpoints from public discourse.
3. FORM AND SUBSTANCE
For Waldron, citizens remain free to articulate the substance
of any viewpoint, because an appropriately worded ban on
extreme expression regulates only the form of that viewpoint’s
expression.32 In essence, say what you like, just tone down the
language. Theorists of language, however, abandoned that formsubstance distinction ages ago. Its last exponents were the 20th
century logical positivists, such as Rudolph Carnap33 and Alfred

32.
33.

See Waldron, supra note 8, at 700–01, 713–14.
RUDOLF CARNAP, DER LOGISCHE AUFBAU DER WELT [THE LOGICAL
STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD] 1928 (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag 1999).
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Ayer.34 Logical positivism quickly became discredited, however,
by the “linguistic turn” in philosophy and social sciences.35
Consider the sentence “Eve desires the apple.” We can
imagine any number of similar utterances: “Eve craves the apple,”
“The apple is tempting Eve,” “The apple sings out to Eve,” and
so forth. On the logical-positivist view, those sentences share a
core or fixed meaning, something like: “Eve wants the apple.”
Accordingly, if the state of Puritania bans the use of the verbs
“desire,” “crave,” “tempt,” and “sing,” only the form of
expression is lost, not the substance. The substance can be
conveyed through the verb “want.” After all, who ever heard of
singing apples?
If I complain that “want,” “desire,” and “crave” are
separated by nuance, that their differences are not objectively
ascertained but rather a matter of “hunch” or “intuition,” the
logical positivists insist that such differences can only be either
demonstrable or meaningless.36 They might add that what appear
to be subjective differences are in fact matters of degree: the verb
“desires” just means, for example, that Eve “really wants” the
apple, and “craves” just means, to quote the Spice Girls, that Eve
“really, really wants” it.
Given the scope of the present essay, I shall forego any
attempt to summarise over a century of post-Wittgensteinian
linguistic philosophy, post-Heideggerian phenomenology, postSaussaurian semiotics, post-Freudian social theory, and postromantic aesthetic theory. I’ll simply assume that the differences
between “want,” “desire,” and “crave,” even when they at times
correlate to differences of degree, do not wholly reduce to
material or measurable quanta. Such words are never perfectly
coextensive nor perfectly interchangeable. Barring ironic
contexts, “Eve craves the apple” surely does mean that she wants
it, and indeed that she desires it, but need not exhaustively and
exclusively mean either.
Puritania, then, unquestionably bans certain types of
expression on viewpoint-selective grounds. If I may lawfully say

34. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (New York, Dover Pub.
1952) (1936).
35. See, e.g., THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard
M. Rorty ed., Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press 1967).
36. AYER, supra note 34.
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“Eve wants the apple” but not “Eve craves the apple,” it is
because “craves” sparks associations—ideas—that Puritania aims
to repress, irrespective of the intelligence of the ban or of the links
it presupposes between means and ends. Even the broadest hate
speech ban in any fully-fledged democracy today does not, of
course, sweep as broadly as Puritania’s ban. Yet however
prudently a ban on extreme expression per se may be tailored and
implemented, it can never allow speakers to say “the same thing”
but just with different words.
Waldron defends bans on “stirring up of hatred in a
community against a section of or a group within that
community.”37 Before we proceed, and as a secondary though not
unimportant matter, it may help to observe that Waldron
apparently means not “community,” but rather “state,” in both
instances in that sentence. The word “community” entails two
meanings, either of which would serve more to dilute Waldron’s
thesis than to strengthen it. First, the term “community” is
commonly used today to denote a sub-group within the modern
state. Yet Waldron surely does not envisage laws drafted solely
for the state to govern such groups internally. He presumably
envisages the opposite: bans applicable to all citizens throughout
the entirety of a given jurisdiction. Second, if Waldron is using
“community” here in a universalist vein, to suggest the validity of
his position even outside modern statist contexts—perhaps to
include the societies of ancient Babylonians, or medieval
Samurais, or pre-Columbian Aztecs—then he needs a theory of
legal legitimacy applicable not only to modern democracies but to
those societies as well. Given our present difficulties in agreeing
even on modern, democratic legitimacy, it is hard to see how such
an ambition can streamline his task. I shall therefore proceed on
the assumption that Waldron’s aim is to defend bans against
stirring up of hatred within a modern state against a section of or
a group within that state.
Now let’s return to our main problem: any view that speech
bans admit tidier versions of “the same” message, but which have
no such “stirring up” intent or effect, suggests that we are dealing
not with the same message, but with a different one, even if the
two respective messages do both aim to promote the same broad
(racist, homophobic, etc.) attitude. A given essage M1 and a given
37.

Waldron, supra note 8, at 701; cf. id. at 700–04.
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message M2 may both be racist, and may both in that sense express
some, perhaps similar racist viewpoint. Similarly, racist R1 and
racist R2 may both be racists, and may both in that sense express
some, perhaps similar racist viewpoint. Neither logically nor
linguistically, however, does it follow either that M1 and M2, or
that R1 and R2 express the same viewpoint.
Those who already feel put off by what they see as civillibertarians’ perversely zealous defences of racist bullies and
homophobic thugs may admittedly feel they can take little
succour in my argument so far. For them, it’s bad enough that
opponents of hate speech bans have defended free speech for such
low-lifes. Now, not even satisfied with that, by exploding formsubstance distinctions, I’m weirdly granting their Neanderthal
outbursts (no offense to Neanderthals) a kind of expressive
uniqueness. Now it seems that “faggot” and “filthy Jew” must be
allowed to retain their special little bounce, their imaginative flair,
which the more humdrum “homosexual” and “Jew” may not
muster.
And yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying, for the simple reason
that the contrary view lacks any plausible theory of language. I
wholly acknowledge that, as a purely practical matter, nominal
replacements of vicious for anodyne turns of phrase can indeed
be made. Such sterilising substitutions are certainly feasible as a
matter of makeshift routine. What remains wholly false is any
suggestion that the state thereby succeeds in regulating only a
message’s form and not its substance or viewpoint. To suggest the
contrary is like saying: “Don’t bother reading Finnegan’s Wake.
I’ll explain its substance to you.” Of course that comparison
exaggerates the problem. Joyce’s narrative patently amounts to
something denser than the mindless word “faggot.” But it is an
exaggeration only in degree, not in character.
One objection to my view might be that some hateful
utterances are fundamentally “performative.” They operate not
simply to express an idea, but above all to effectuate the realworld construction of others as detestable. That view has won
wide acceptance,38 but it reads too literally the theory of linguistic
38. See, e.g., Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
293, 305–30 (1993); Rae Langton, Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and
Pornography, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 72 (Ishani
Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Ishani Maitra,
Subordinating Speech, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 94;
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performatives.
To
observe
the
“illocutionary”
or
“perlocutionary” effects of certain utterances is one thing. To
suggest that, being performative, such effects thereby remove
from those utterances any expression of a viewpoint is altogether
another. If they did, how would we even know the utterances to
be hateful? None of the writers examining the linguistic
performativity of hate speech have ventured quite that far.39
4. ILLEGITIMACY WITHOUT DISOBEDIENCE
Waldron’s form-substance distinction serves a broader
strategy. He aims to establish that civil libertarians overstate the
extent to which bans on extreme speech per se end up excluding
citizens from public discourse. Waldron accuses them of making
claims that are “as loose as they think they can get away with.”40
He charges them with two types of “hyperbole.”41 First, Dworkin
claims far too broadly that speakers as individuals end up
altogether excluded from public discourse when they are
penalised for their views. Second, Weinstein, albeit “more
modest,”42 still claims rather too broadly that not speakers as such
but still their particular viewpoints end up illegitimately excluded.
Yet Waldron cannot sustain even that latter gripe, as it relies
on the form-substance distinction. Consider an analogy. When
U.S. public interest lawyers litigate against practices of racial
gerrymandering, they commonly complain that black people end
up “disenfranchised.” That is a broad term, encompassing not
only a range of possible material effects but also a—perfectly
reasonable—rhetorical plea. Those lawyers do not claim that their
clients have literally lost all rights of citizenship. Nor, then do they
draw any conclusion that, until such time as the electoral
boundaries be re-drawn, their clients must be deemed exempt
from all duties of citizenship as well, gaining thereby the license
to act with total lawlessness. Read in the context of his lifetime’s
output, none of which advocates radical disobedience to law,

Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, Introduction and Overview, in SPEECH & HARM:
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 1. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997).
39. For a further critique of performativity theories see HEINZE (2016), supra note 2,
at 137–42.
40. Waldron, supra note 8, at 700.
41. Id. at 701, 711.
42. Id. at 705.
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Dworkin’s “hyperbole” is arguably little different—or at any rate
can plausibly be read in such terms.
Strictly speaking, however, Waldron does persuasively reject
any right of disobedience that might be claimed by a citizen whose
views are excluded under a ban on extreme speech per se.
Weinstein, on Waldron’s view, “wants to reach a point at which
we can say that [some person] P has a right to disobey” a law
contrary to P’s banned viewpoint “or a right that it not be
enforced against him.”43 This would indeed be my only serious
reservation about Dworkin’s or Weinstein’s stances. In an effort
to explain the democratic illegitimacy of viewpoint-selective
penalties, Weinstein risks derailing his thesis by re-igniting wellworn disputes about justified disobedience to law. Dworkin or
Weinstein certainly would be wrong to conclude that any such
remedy follows from the illegitimacy of bans. Recall that theories
of civil disobedience, as opposed to theories of anarchic
opposition to all law, aim mostly to identify circumstances that
render conduct ethically right despite entailing legal violations.
Even the most indulgent theories generally prescribe that the
dissenter must still face the legal consequences.44
One might try to retain a narrower immunity to law by
limiting justified disobedience to laws “directly” relating to the
proscribed speech, such as laws imposing upon employers various
non-discrimination norms contrary to the viewpoints of excluded
hate speakers.45 Ultimately, however, any such narrowing
becomes too arbitrary. For example, a hate speaker expounding a
comprehensively conspiratorial worldview (e.g., “Jews run the
world”) can link that outlook to any legal norm or practice, right
down to a speed limit or a tax on cigarettes. Once a citizen is
excluded pro tanto from public discourse, there is no area of law
to which that exclusion becomes irrelevant in principle. Waldron
wins, then, in rejecting any justified disobedience on the part of
pro tanto excluded citizens. But that victory is secondary, not
decisive. Dworkin and Weinstein remain entirely correct on the
main point, that is, in deeming democratically illegitimate any ban
on extreme expression per se. The only remedy either of them
43.
44.

Id. at 709.
See, e.g., M. B. E. Smith, The Duty to Obey the Law, in A COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 457, 465-74 (Dennis Patterson ed., Blackwell
Pub. 1996).
45. Waldron, supra note 8, at 706.
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needs to propose is that, to the extent of such bans’ illegitimacy,
they ought to be repealed.
The citizen’s prerogative of expression within public
discourse remains necessary to democracy, not as a matter of
sheer expedience on a consequentialist criterion, but as a matter
of principle—on a deontological criterion. To call an abridgment
“slight” or de minimis is to misconstrue the character of a
deontological argument. To draw a related analogy, in most
democracies today the empirically measurable effect of one
fraudulent ballot paper on an electoral outcome will usually be
nil. On any consequentialist measure, it would have no impact and
would be of no material importance, particularly in comparison to
the many pressing problems states must every day confront.
But that purely consequentialist criterion diminishes the
inherent illegitimacy of the falsified ballot paper to near-triviality.
A deontological criterion yields precisely the opposite
normativity. The illegitimacy of one single act of falsification is
categorical. It is not materially negated even by purely negligible
real-world effects. If such conduct is indeed rare overall, one
might fairly be accused of exaggerating its significance as a
practical matter, because the society may face more immanently
threatening problems. So, yes, in a context of such rare voter
fraud, I would surely overlook it and would focus instead on
environmental protection or tax equity. But the absolute
illegitimacy of even a single ballot falsification remains
undiminished by the mere observation that the actual occurrence
of such conduct is rare or of scant impact. Infrequency renders
such wrongdoing less threatening in practice, not less infirm in
principle. (We could draw many such analogies. If only one adult
on the entire planet abused a child, then the evil of child abuse
certainly would not create a general social problem, but that
single adult’s conduct would remain categorically heinous, wholly
irrespective of the absence of such conduct by other adults.) You
are certainly free to accuse me of hyperbole for insisting on the
absolute illegitimacy of one fraudulent ballot paper, given such
calamities as rampant war crimes or global warming. But all you
are then making is a straightforward consequentialist observation
about practical effects, and not a normative argument about
legitimacy.
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5. CRITERIA OF LEGITIMACY
A problem with Waldron’s claims about legitimacy in his
writing prior to the present debate is that he had never in the past
explained what he thinks the right concept of legitimacy to be,
instead attempting only to explain why Dworkin’s and
Weinstein’s are wrong. Waldron certainly proffers various
arguments of general social policy to support bans on extreme
speech, all of which only beg the question of those bans’ legal
legitimacy. That is why he and other defenders of bans need to
win the present debate. If they lose, then all their remaining
arguments, explaining that some extreme expression is bad,46 fail
to establish that a democracy can legitimately ban it. Having made
the two adjustments proposed in Section 2, we did glean from
Waldron’s present article that to be legitimate, a law must be
rightly enforceable even against citizens who dispute its justice. But
that criterion is purely formal. It merely begs the question as to
the kind of law that counts as “rightly enforceable.”
It might help if, in addition to challenging Dworkin’s or
Weinstein’s view in a solely offensive posture, he could propose
precise criteria of his own. By an “offensive posture,” I mean that
Waldron aims only to explain why hate speech bans aren’t
illegitimate.47 He argues, for example, “what I have said doesn’t
deny that hate speech laws may have an impact on legitimacy;
what I am denying is that they have an impact on the state’s right
to enforce particular laws against individuals.”48 That view
presents a few puzzles, some easier to resolve than others.
Let’s start with a preliminary obstacle, simply because of the
conceptual precision our topic demands. To be sure, such a
“right” is often ascribed colloquially to states, particularly in
broadly ethical as opposed to strictly legal contexts. Yet strictly
speaking—say, in a Hohfeldian sense—what Waldron surely
means in characterising a state’s scope of action in this area is not
46. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 4, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39,
45, 59, 65–69, 72, 96–97, 116–17 (2012) [hereinafter WALDRON (2012)]; Jeremy Waldron,
Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH
329, 331. Cf. Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and the Normative Foundations of Regulation, 9
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 590, 614 (2013) [hereinafter Heinze (2013)]. See also works cited in
note 12, supra.
47. Waldron might be said to touch on legitimacy in his recourse to Rawls’s construct
of the well-ordered society, but does not do so in any obvious way. See critically Heinze
(2013), supra note 46, at 606–14.
48. Waldron, supra note 8, at 711 (emphasis added).
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its right to avail itself of existing law (which would merely beg the
question at issue, namely, as to what that existing law may
legitimately be), but rather its legitimate power both to make and
to enforce “particular laws against individuals.”49 When we
enquire into the extent of free speech, our enquiry is ordinarily
into the extent of the individual’s right to enjoy that freedom, as
against a government’s legitimate power to limit it.
What counts, then, as a legitimate power? As I have thus far
argued, the illegitimacy of a ban on extreme expression per se
does not invalidate a state’s legitimate power to enforce other
laws, such as non-discrimination laws, against persons who had
been barred pro tanto from publicly speaking about those laws.
What Waldron offers here, however, is a non-denial that bans may
impact legitimacy. Is that a yes or a no? Given his repeated
defence of bans, what is he claiming here? He cannot be referring
to poorly drafted bans, since it is trivially obvious that a poorly
drafted limit on essential democratic freedoms by definition
impacts on legitimacy. What he apparently means is that even
soundly drafted bans “may have an impact on legitimacy.”
But how? Waldron commonly introduces his position on free
speech not as a “wish to persuade” his audiences of hate speech
bans’ “wisdom and legitimacy,” but only as a hope that his readers
should better “understand” the bans’ rationales.50 But those
disclaimers are misleading. I shall leave aside the question of
whether Waldron’s many substantive claims can only seriously be
construed as deeming bans to be necessary to achieve substantive
justice. What lies beyond dispute is that, in his several writings,
Waldron zealously insists that bans are permissible under criteria
of democratic legitimacy.51 Yet here he claims that well-drafted
bans “may” nevertheless be illegitimate. Bans can, then, be
substantively just yet democratically flawed—so to speak,
illegitimately good. But that approach turns legitimacy on its head.
Waldron’s task, on his own stated criterion, is to identify
legitimate norms regardless of their substantive justice, and not
substantive justice regardless of its legitimacy.
49. Id. at 711.
50. See, e.g., WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 10; cf. id. at 11–12; Jeremy Waldron
& James Weinstein, The Legal Response to Hate Speech: Should the U.S. be more like
Europe? 48:04 – 48:59 (Oct 26, 2012), http://online.law.asu.edu/Events/2012/HateSpeach
(Retrieved Sep. 1, 2013).
51. See HEINZE (2016), supra note 3, at 25 n.79.
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In his previous writing Waldron observes— without express
disapproval or proposing any alternative—that, “[i]n social
science, legitimacy often means little more than popular
support.”52 In a nutshell, if Americans don’t want bans, that’s
legitimate for them; but if Europeans do want bans, that’s just as
legitimate. Bans or no bans are equally legitimate— a view
consonant with his questionable “I’m not taking a stand either
way” protestations. That straightforwardly sociological or
majoritarian criterion—legitimacy means whatever enough
people want it to mean—would have spared everyone from
Socrates to Kant much toil, as it equally turns legitimacy on its
head. To collapse legitimacy into the sheer “is” of the head count
is to empty it of any distinct meaning. Either legitimacy is an
“ought” concept or it has no particular meaning at all. Waldron’s
job is not to collapse legitimacy into popular support, but, to the
contrary, to ask whether or under what circumstances popular
support, or any other criterion, supplies legitimacy.
In a break from those previous stances, however, Waldron
does in the present exchange acknowledge a more distinctly
normative criterion of legitiamcy. He claims to discover it in the
views of “moral philosophers,” for whom “the best argument for
the legitimacy of our laws (or of any particular law L) is a showing
that the laws are morally justified or that L in particular is morally
justified.”53 We have to take that thesis at face value because
Waldron doesn’t tell us who those moral philosophers are or how
they defend that position against what any number of their fellow
philosophers would have to recognise as its patent vacuousness.
After all, since when is “morally justified” facially more
perspicuous than “legitimate”? Theories of morals have been
written for centuries. Which one are we assuming? Does this
formula merely revert back to Waldron’s earlier sociological or
majoritarian criteria?
On face value it is far from clear, moreover, that such a test
is a distinct criterion of legitimacy at all, as opposed to a criterion
that merely confuses legitimacy with its aforementioned
colloquial meanings,54 indifferently equating it with policy or
justice or goodness or morals or ethics writ large. Nowhere, for

52.
53.
54.

WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 184. Cf. HEINZE (2016), supra note 2, at 44.
Waldron, supra note 8, at 707.
See above Section 2.
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example, does Waldron distinguish legitimacy in that formula
from its more particular meaning within the contractarian
tradition, which at least prima facie it rather blatantly contradicts.
Unfortunately, then, Waldron does propose here a notion of
legitimacy, but it in no way progresses beyond his earlier
sociological or majoritarian criterion—which is not a normative
criterion at all, but merely a social barometer.
6. DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY
In a curious coda, Waldron concludes his essay on a
completely novel point. He had, again, regularly invoked the
form-content distinction, which was only ever relevant to try
(unsuccessfully, as I have claimed) to argue that the state is not
punishing the expression of particular viewpoints. Now, as if
making an obvious afterthought, he abruptly suggests that it
doesn’t matter even if bans do target certain viewpoints. Now
suddenly viewpoints altogether ought to be censored insofar as “a
society needs social peace and it is entitled to the assistance of
citizens in maintaining that peace.”55
No democrat even fleetingly versed in the history of free
speech can mean such a claim with anything like the baldness with
which Waldron states it. Our long chronicle of censorship, dating
back centuries and indeed millennia, is nothing but a history of
claims—often made in good faith—about “social peace”: from
imprisoning heretics, to censoring liberals, to banning
communists, to hunting down jihadists. It’s largely the origin of
modern First Amendment jurisprudence in the U.S. As far back
as Plato’s Republic, proceeding via Hobbes’s Leviathan, all sorts
of individual freedoms have been deemed abridgeable in the
name of achieving “social peace.”
Waldron concedes that in difficult cases the law should
generally stay “on the liberal side.”56 Yet with his core concepts
of legitimacy so wholly indeterminate, he offers no obvious point
at which claims for “social peace” end and those for “the liberal
side” begin. What’s to stop Waldron’s concept of “social peace”
reducing to straightforwardly majoritarian or sociological criteria
just as readily as his concept of legitimacy?

55.
56.

Waldron, supra note 8, at 713.
WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 126.
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Once again, Waldron appears to make a claim about
legitimacy, but ends up altogether side-lining it as a distinct
political value, this time summarily collapsing it into the
consequentialist terms of the weary “freedom versus security”
trade-off. Even on that point, Waldron is simply assuming a
material causation—that such abridgment of freedom does
indeed lead to greater social peace—for which he cites no
evidence.57 He frequently praises various democracies for their
bans, but for all of his consequentialist assumptions he never
actually examines empirical evidence from any of them in any
rigorous way. On the available record, “social peace” has declined
over several decades in a number of democracies that maintain
bans,58 some of them applauded by Waldron.
And if Waldron did have such evidence? Social peace is an
interest of all governments. Yes, a democracy needs it, but only in
the sense that any constitutional form needs it. It is in no way an
interest specifically constitutive of democracy. Jill Hasday
altogether reasonably suggests that democracies may “need social
peace more than authoritarian regimes because they depend more
on the population’s cooperation, as opposed to fear.”59 Whether
states rely on sticks or carrots, however, is a question about
means, not ends. Authoritarian states indeed seek peace through
intimidation, whilst democracies seek it through trust. In both
cases, however, it is social peace they seek. Social peace is, in sum,
a security interest shared by all states, and not an interest unique
to democracies. Once again, then, we witness the question of
democratic legitimacy not resolved but eschewed. Serving a
security interest may well legitimate a state as a state but in no way
legitimates it as a democracy. For the time being, then, Waldron
remains at square one. Any specifically democratic concept
legitimacy is inherently normative. If one wishes to defend bans
on extreme expression per se, then one must adduce a specifically
normative theory of legitimacy—and it must be a democratic one.
Waldron and other defenders of speech bans have thus far failed
at that task.

57.
58.
59.

HEINZE (2016), supra note 2, at 124–29.
See, e.g., id. at 145–53.
Private communication of 5 March 2017, on file with author.

